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Abstract: This article uses a policy scientific approach to reconstruct assumptions underlying the
Dutch Educational Supervision Act. We show an example of how to reconstruct and evaluate a pro-
gram theory that is based on legislation of inspection. The assumptions explain how inspection
leads to school improvement. Evaluation of these assumptions is used to predict the (in)effective-
ness of this legislation. The article concludes by discussing the advantages and drawbacks of this
kind of approach as a starting point for impact and effect studies. As the program theory of inspec-
tion includes elements common to other kinds of educational interventions and reforms, these ele-
ments can also be considered for other types of program theory.
Keywords: program theory; school inspections; supervision act; education
Every year, the central government of the Netherlands fulfills its constitutional duty ofsupervising education by dispatching a team of 72 inspectors to make 2,265 visits to pri-
mary schools. These inspectors visit schools half a day every year for a short yearly inspection
and 2 days every 4 years for a more elaborate quality control. This extended visit is also carried
out if the yearly visit shows defects in school quality. Before this visit, schools receive a letter
requesting them to send information to the inspectorate, such as their prospectus and school
plan. Schools are also invited to fill in questionnaires about, for example, their pedagogical
vision, their lesson tables, and the didactic they use. During the (extended) school visit, the
inspector observes a number of lessons and interviews teachers, the school director, parents,
and pupils. These observations and interviews are used to obtain a picture of how the school is
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doing on the standards of the inspectorate that are part of a framework for inspection. This
framework contains, among others, a general description of the type of pedagogical climate the
school should have, the teaching and learning strategies that should be used, and how schools
should take care of pupils with learning difficulties. The framework exists of both legal require-
ments, which are formulated in the educational acts, and quality standards, which are formu-
lated in the Educational Supervision Act. At the end of the visit, the inspector feeds back his or
her judgment to the school and writes a school report that is published on the Internet.
Implemented in January 2003, the Educational Supervision Act specified these (and other)
working methods and described the framework for inspection. The act specifies certain expec-
tations about how schools should be inspected, the effects such inspections are expected to
have, and how these effects should be realized. Together, these assumptions form the program
theory of the Educational Supervision Act. Identifying and explicating this program theory
enables a critical evaluation of the validity of the assumptions. In this article, we will recon-
struct the program theory by specifying the intentions of the legal act. The accuracy of the
assumptions will be evaluated, and the benefits and pitfalls of a program theory method for
evaluation studies will be discussed.
Method
The first step is to reconstruct the assumptions that explain how inspection is supposed to
work. This conglomerate of assumptions forms the program theory (Chen, 1990). Next, the
reconstruction of the program theory is validated to be sure of having a legitimate overview of
the assumptions. The last phase consists of a critical evaluation.
Choices to Be Made
The reconstruction phase starts with a number of choices that have to be made. First of all,
the aims of reconstructing the program theory have to be stated. According to Fleurke and
Huizenga (1988), possible aims may be to describe, to explain, or to predict the (in)effective-
ness of a program or to analyze the way policy is developed. The program theory in this study is
part of a larger research project designed to measure effects and side effects of inspection in the
Netherlands. The aim of reconstructing the program theory is therefore to predict the (in)effec-
tiveness of inspection by describing and evaluating how schools should be inspected according
to the Educational Supervision Act, the effects such inspections should have, and how these
effects should be realized.
Second, the method of gathering information about assumptions should be chosen. The
(re)construction of the program theory should be explained, and the way in which assumptions
are explained should be described. As the Educational Supervision Act is leading in our study,
analyzing this act and the documents that are related to it is a logical starting point. Other possi-
bilities are group discussions and interviews with relevant respondents. The advantage of docu-
ments in relation to interviews and discussions is, however, that expressions are often more con-
sistent (Karstanje, 1996). Documents such as the memorandum of explanation and the minutes
of governmental discussion concerning the act are also vital for interpreting the act when it is
challenged in a legal setting, such as a courtroom.
Translating the information into assumptions can be done in a number of ways. Selection of
one of these methods is the third choice to be made. Leeuw (2003, p. 7) described a number of
methods (that relate to the way information is gathered). We will use the policy scientific
approach, which consists of the following steps:
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1. Identify the social and behavioral mechanisms that are expected to solve the problem; search for-
mal and informal documents for statements indicating the necessity of solving the social, organi-
zational, or policy problem in question, the goals of the proposed policy or program, and how they
are to be achieved. These latter statements refer to mechanisms (or “engines”) that drive the poli-
cies or programs and are believed to make them effective. Examples are manifold. They include
determinants of innovation diffusion, mechanisms underlying Prisoner’s Dilemma games, pro-
cesses producing social capital, cognitive dissonance, different types of learning behavior, and
many more. Statements having the following form are especially relevant for detecting these
mechanisms:
• It is evident that x will work.
• In our opinion, the best way to address this problem is to . . .
• The only way to solve this problem is to . . .
• Our institution’s x years of experience tell us that . . .
2. Compile a survey of these statements and link the mechanisms to the goals of the program under
review.
3. Reformulate the statements into conditional “if-then” propositions or propositions of a similar
structure (e.g., “the more x, the less y”).
4. Search for warrants that will identify disconnects in or among different propositions using argu-
mentation analysis. Founded in part on Toulmin’s (1964) The Use of Argument, argumentation
analysis refers to a model for analyzing chains of arguments and helps to reconstruct and “fill in”
argumentations. A central concept is the warrant, which, according to Toulmin (1958) and Mason
and Mitroff (1981), is the “because” part of an argument. A warrant says that B follows from A
because of a (generally) accepted principle. For example, “the organization’s performance will not
improve next year” follows from “the performance of this organization has not improved during
the past 5 years” because of the principle that past performance is the best predictor of future per-
formance. The “because” part of such an argument is often left implicit, with the consequence that
warrants must be inferred by the person performing the analysis.
5. Reformulate these warrants in terms of conditional “if-then” (or similar) propositions and draw a
chart of the (mostly causal) links.
Examples
To clarify these steps, two examples will be given of how statements were used to recon-
struct assumptions. These examples primarily explain the first three steps. The first example
clarifies how a single statement, containing a global description, is rephrased into a hypotheti-
cal if-then assumption. As the reconstruction only calls for a sharpening, this is an easy
reconstruction.
Example 1
The statement “Compliance control will focus on ensuring a certain level of quality”1 trans-
lates into the following assumption: “If the inspectorate controls compliance of schools, then
schools will (eventually) attain a satisfactory level of quality.”
The second level of interpretation concerns matching different statements to form a single
assumption.
Example 2
The statements “The inspectorate should stimulate schools’ responsibility for enhancing the
quality of education”; “as a learning organization, a school should have primary responsibility
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for monitoring and improving its own quality;”2 and “When they are rewarded with less intense
and less frequent inspection, schools will be motivated to develop good quality assurance sys-
tems”3 translate into the following assumption: “If the inspectorate decreases the intensity and
frequency of inspection in case a school has developed a quality assurance system and delivers
good educational quality, schools will develop systems for quality assurance.”
Participant Check
After reconstructing the program theory, the reconstruction is validated, in the sense of
being reviewed by relevant actors, to be sure that the assumptions actually represent the inten-
tions of the act. This kind of participant check is often described as a criterion the reconstruction
should meet. Performing it separately enables us, however, to be more specific about faulty
interpretations during the reconstruction phase. The intermediate adjustments can be explained
and accounted for.
A first list of reconstructed assumptions was checked by interviewing 14 people responsible
for the original statements. Members of the House of Representatives of the States General,
employees of the inspectorate and the Ministry of Education, and members of the Educational
Council were asked to indicate whether the assumptions (translated into statements) fit the
intention of the Educational Supervision Act. If not, interviewees were asked why, in their view,
this was not the case.
This participant check led to combining two forms of inspection (inspection of quality stan-
dards, which are described in the Educational Supervision Act, and inspection of compliance
with legal requirements, which are formulated in the educational acts) into one (inspection of
school quality). No other adjustments were made. The Results section shows the assumptions
that correspond to the intentions and assumptions of those involved in creating the act.
Evaluation
A critical evaluation of the program theory is the last phase of the study. Results of prior
research are used to analyze how consistent, complete, and realistic the assumptions are. By
doing so, the potential effects (and side effects) of the act can be predicted. If prior research
shows that the assumptions have a low potential of actually meeting the desired effects, a num-
ber of conclusions may follow. One of them can be to adjust the act or to use other variables in
further investigation of effects from educational inspections.
Results
Our starting point for reconstructing the assumptions was the memorandum Varieteit en
Waarborg (Variety and Guarantee; Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, 1999), in which
the Minister of Education sketched the basics of renewed inspection. The publication of the
Educational Supervision Act in the Government Gazette, 2.5 years later, forms the beginning of
this renewed inspection.
The first memorandum (p. 8) specifies two functions of supervision: (a) Through inspection,
the government guarantees that schools will deliver a satisfactory level of educational quality
for all citizens, and (b) through inspection, the government stimulates schools to develop their
own quality assurance system, which will lead to improvement in the quality of education. The
discussion about the Educational Supervision Act focused on how these functions should be
carried out. The results in this section convey the final choices that were made.
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According to the Educational Supervision Act, guaranteeing a satisfactory level of educa-
tional quality is achieved primarily through inspection of legal requirements that schools
should comply with. These requirements are placed on schools by educational laws; they are a
prerequisite for receiving governmental funding.4 Because the legal requirements alone are
considered to be insufficient for achieving the goal of improved education, the Educational
Supervision Act further specifies quality standards (that partly elaborate on the legal require-
ments). The inspectorate is entitled to evaluate these quality standards in such a manner that
schools are challenged to provide higher standards of quality than those considered merely sat-
isfactory.5 Challenged is the key word here as schools are not obliged to meet the quality stan-
dards, as they are obliged to comply with legal requirements. The quality standards are only
intended to guide the working methods of the inspectorate, which consist of assessing the
schools’ performance and confronting the schools with their strong and weak points in relation
to a framework for inspection. As a matter of fact, this framework contains both the legal
requirements that schools should comply with and the quality standards that inspectors use to
assess schools. Such confrontation of schools with their strong and weak points is expected to
make schools that are performing below standards aware that they can and should do better.6 As
schools are seen as organizations that are willing to change, information about weak points is
considered to be a major challenge and stimulant for change.
The Educational Supervision Act also provides for proportional inspection, in which the
amount and frequency of inspection varies according to the results of quality assurance of
schools.7 Schools that have a quality assurance system that provides reliable information about
the inspection standards are visited less frequently and intensively. The inspectorate uses this
information for its own school reports and does not have to gather all the necessary information
itself by visiting schools.
The publication of the inspection reports is the final method employed by the inspectorate to
stimulate quality.8 Parents are expected to take note of the report and act upon it. These actions
should also challenge schools to change.
It is assumed in the Educational Supervision Act that these forms of inspection are capable of
generating improvements in the quality of education. Quality is described as the provision of
equal educational opportunities to all young people9 and as the value added by schools in terms
of student achievement.10 Three main assumptions that may be articulated from this description
of the pillars of the program theory reconstructed in our study are the following:
• If the inspectorate assesses the quality of schools, schools will attain satisfactory levels of quality
and will also offer more added value in terms of student achievement.
• If the inspectorate employs proportional inspection, schools will offer more added value.
• If the inspectorate publishes its findings in an accessible manner, schools will offer more added
value.
The model presented in Figure 1 shows these assumptions, which will be described in more
detail below. The subsequent paragraphs will elaborate on this framework.
Quality Assessment
The framework used by the inspectorate to assess school quality integrates two types of indi-
cators: legal requirements and quality standards.11 Legal requirements are formulated in the
separate educational acts. Schools have to meet these requirements to receive governmental
financing. These requirements describe, for example, a number of educational goals or state
that schools should prepare their pupils for secondary education. Quality standards, such as an
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adequate pedagogical climate and supply of subject matter, are part of the Educational Supervi-
sion Act and are intended to guide the inspectorate in assessing schools. Schools are not obliged
to meet these criteria.
As legal requirements and quality standards overlap to a considerable extent12 and quality
standards often refine the legal requirements, they are integrated in the framework for inspec-
tion. However, freedom of education is highly valued in the Netherlands and implies that
schools are free to determine how they will organize their education. As long as they comply
with legal requirements, they cannot be sanctioned or be obliged to change.13 The official docu-
mentation14 of the debate regarding the Educational Supervision Act emphasizes that the
inspectorate should distinctively inform schools about failing to comply with legal require-
ments or failing to meet the quality standards. In general, policy makers expect schools to sup-
port the framework, as it was developed in close cooperation with educational organiza-
tions that represent schools.15 Schools that do so will consequently also use the feedback of
the inspectorate, regardless of whether that feedback concerns legal requirements or quality
standards.16
How schools should use the feedback, and what role the inspectorate should take in this pro-
cess, is not clear. On one hand, the program theory emphasizes the school’s own responsibility
for improvement, whereas on the other hand, it argues that schools should be guided by
inspection.
The first argument, about schools carrying responsibilities for their own quality, stresses that
each school should consider its environment in deciding how to improve and act in the best
interest of its pupil population.17 The inspectorate provides schools with information about
their strengths and weaknesses18 and asks schools to account for the choices they have made
instead of making these choices for them.
For schools considered qualitatively weak in ways that go beyond meeting legal demands, a
different approach is indicated, including more elaborate visits, possible extra financial means,
and the requirement to develop plans for improvement that should be assessed by the inspector-
ate.19 In this case, over and above its evaluative role, the inspectorate should also fulfill an advi-
sory function for weaker schools, specifying possible improvements and explaining how things
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Schools attain satisfactory 
levels of educational quality 
Publication of findings 
Inspectorate assesses 
quality of schools  
Proportional inspection  
Schools offer more educational 
quality and added value 
Figure 1
Framework for Program Theory
can be done differently.20 The documents refrain from giving a definition of weak schools. The
Memorandum of Explanation (p. 6) specifies, however, that the improvement trajectories of
schools are explicitly voluntary, unless schools fail to comply with legal requirements. The
advisory function therefore seems to be applied to schools that fail to comply with legal
requirements.
The reconstructed program theory states the expectation that school improvement will
always lead to higher quality in educational processes. The improvement of educational pro-
cesses (or educational quality), in its turn, leads schools to offer satisfactory levels of educa-
tional quality and to add more value in terms of student achievement.21
Added value describes the result of a process in which schools bring their pupils up to the
level of performance that can be expected of them—taking into account the students’ perfor-
mance levels at entry—while minimizing the number of students who either leave school or
repeat classes.22
Table 1 provides an example of how the assumptions, concerning the quality assessment of
the inspectorate, can be described in a more explicit and scheduled way.
Proportional Inspection
The proportional working method of inspection describes the use of results of quality assur-
ance and self-evaluation of schools by the inspectorate to form judgments about school
quality.23 To be helpful, the self-evaluation results of schools must be reliable and provide infor-
mation about the indicators included in the inspection framework.24 If these requirements are
met, the inspectorate will confront the schools with fewer and less intense inspection visits.25
However, the Educational Supervision Act also provides for annual visits. These are consid-
ered to be necessary for the frequent monitoring of schools.26 To maintain the proportional
character of inspection, this annual visit should focus on the smallest possible selection of stan-
dards (including quality assurance of schools and pupil learning results, among others) neces-
sary to assess the functioning of the schools.27
The working methods and the capacity of the inspectorate are two ways in which propor-
tional inspection is expected to increase the value added by schools. First, the proportional
inspection method is expected to stimulate schools to develop quality assurance measures and
to evaluate their performance according to their own standards.28 A prerequisite for propor-
tional inspection is that schools are aware of, and agree with, this method of work.29 By consult-
ing with educational organizations that represent schools about the framework for inspection,
the inspectorate strives to ensure that schools both agree with and support the proportional
working method.30
As a result of their quality assurance efforts, schools are expected to be capable of identify-
ing and correcting their own weak points. The documents state that schools are expected to
develop quality assurance that is more elaborate than the conditions specified by the inspector-
ate for proportional inspection. These conditions state that the inspectorate uses the results of
quality assurance of schools if they provide reliable information about the indicators in the
inspection framework. However, schools should not limit their focus to these conditions but
should develop and assess their own quality norms in close contact with, and adjusted to, their
pupil population and environment.31
Quality assurance is expected to lead to increased autonomy for schools to make their own
choices concerning quality policy and to adjust their education to their own context and pupil
population.32 Schools that adjust their education to pupils will eventually add more value.33
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The second way in which proportional inspection leads to increased added value is through
efficient allocation of inspection capacity. The intensity with which weak schools are inspected
is assumed to increase, whereas inspection capacity stays the same.34 For this to happen, how-
ever, the inspectorate must be capable of identifying these schools by assessing the soundness
of procedures and the actual results of their self-evaluations, that is, the assessments schools
make of their own educational quality in relation to the inspection framework.35
If a weak school is subjected to more frequent and intense inspections, it is assumed that the
school will improve and will eventually offer more added value and, consequently, a satisfac-
tory level of educational quality. This assumption is based on the fact that the inspection of
weaker schools is linked to the requirement that schools present improvement plans that will be
closely monitored by the inspectorate.36
Publication of Findings
The findings of school inspections are published with the intent of giving the environment of
the school a role in school improvement. In particular, parents should be able to participate,
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Table 1
Assumptions About Quality Assessment
1. If the inspectorate assesses school quality, schools will attain satisfactory levels of educational quality and offer
more added value.
1.1 If the inspectorate assesses school quality, it will do so using a framework that provides insight into the value
added by schools and into the quality standards necessary to offering added value.
1.2 If the inspection framework provides insight into the value added by schools and into the quality standards nec-
essary to offering added value, this framework will be found both realistic and relevant by schools.
Because the framework is developed in close cooperation with umbrella organizations in the educational field,
which ensures that the framework is feasible for schools.
Because schools will support a framework that is developed in close cooperation with the educational field.
1.3 If schools find the framework realistic and relevant, they will provide the inspectorate with all of the informa-
tion that is needed for carrying out the inspection.
1.4 If all relevant information is available, the inspectorate can provide feedback on the strengths and weaknesses
of the schools.
For strong schools:
1.5 If the inspectorate provides schools and other stakeholders with feedback concerning the strengths and weak-
nesses of particular schools (in dialogue, by separating legal requirements and quality standards, mentioning
only the areas in which particular schools should improve, but not how to do so), schools will improve autono-
mously.
1.6 If schools improve, they will yield more added value.
1.6.1 Autonomous improvement processes are expected to ensure that education is adjusted to the needs of
pupils.
Provided that governmental regulations and inspection give schools enough leeway to do so.
1.6.2 If schools adjust education to the needs of their pupils, more added value will be offered to all segments
of the pupil population, regardless of initial achievement levels.
For weak schools:
1.7 If the inspectorate provides schools and other stakeholders with feedback about strengths and weaknesses,
schools will use this feedback to improve.
1.7.1 If the inspectorate provides schools and other stakeholders with feedback about strengths and weak-
nesses, the inspectorate will also outline the measures to be taken (e.g., more visits) and how schools
can improve.
1.7.2 If the measures to be taken by the inspectorate and the guidelines for improvement are clear, schools
will improve on the basis of the feedback obtained from the inspectorate.
Because the inspection framework is based on research and legitimated through consultation with edu-
cational organizations that represent schools.
1.8 If schools improve as a result of using feedback from the inspectorate, educational quality will be enhanced.
1.9 If educational quality improves, schools will offer more added value in terms of student achievement.
using the independent, accessible, and public information provided by the inspectorate con-
cerning schools. The expectation is that parents, more than any other stakeholders, will use this
information to evaluate the quality of their children’s schools.37 If a school does not meet their
expectations for quality, it is assumed that parents will address the school (or its administrators)
about possible improvements,38 thereby leading schools to improve and add more value.39
Parents can also participate in school improvement by choosing schools that offer high edu-
cational quality; the public information provided by the inspectorate can help them in this selec-
tion process.40 If schools are aware that good schools are popular, they will be stimulated to
improve.41
Public information about schools should stimulate schools to explain their educational pro-
cesses and the learning results of their pupils. As a result, schools will be accountable to their
environments for their actions (and for the results of these actions).42 Parents will thus be able to
inform themselves about the quality of their children’s schools and to address the schools if
their expectations for educational quality are not met.
The program theory assumes that inspection leads to satisfactory quality of educational pro-
cesses and to more added value in terms of student achievement. To stimulate educational qual-
ity (in either way), inspection must consist of a proportional working method using a frame-
work for inspection that results in the publication of information concerning the quality of
schools. Figure 2 shows the relationships among these assumptions.
Evaluation
The program theory seeks to clarify how inspection should lead to certain effects. How con-
sistent, complete, and realistic are the underlying assumptions? The answer to this question
suggests possible flaws in the program theory that arise when assumptions are incorrect and
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Figure 2
Program Theory Concerning the Educational Supervision Act
when inspection (as planned) is not able to produce the desired effects (Weiss, 1997). Results
from prior research provide clues concerning the accuracy of the assumptions.
Consistency
The program theory is inconsistent in a number of ways. These all seem to be related to the
freedom of education that is laid down in Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution. This article
implies that as long as schools meet certain legal requirements, government and inspection have
no formal responsibility for school improvement. One might even say that Article 23 implies
that the inspectorate should stay away from pedagogical interference. This fits the current soci-
etal and political opinion in the Netherlands that schools should be autonomous and have their
own responsibilities in providing and organizing their education. What the exact place and
responsibilities of the inspectorate are is not clear though. In a system where government dereg-
ulates, the inspectorate is considered to be the countervailing power at the end of the chain.43
Schools have to be in charge of their own quality but should at the end account for the actions
they have taken and the results they have achieved. However, a stable and accepted modus of
autonomy of schools in relation to deregulation by government has not been found yet. The
tasks and responsibilities of the inspectorate that are, in any way, related to improvement of
schools seem to be ambiguously devised as a result of obscurities in this system. A clear defini-
tion of how far autonomy of failing schools goes and the exact responsibilities of the inspector-
ate when encountering a failing school is needed. When the ultimate goal is to improve failing
schools, a simple statement that the inspectorate can only name and report about failing schools
does not seem to be sufficient.
A second ambiguity exists in the framework for inspection that integrates legal requirements
and quality aspects. Schools are obliged to improve on the legal requirements, whereas they are
free to decide on possible improvements in relation to the quality aspects. The first part in
the feedback of inspectors is therefore compulsory, whereas the second part is voluntary. On
one hand, the inconsistency concerns the integration of legal requirements and quality aspects
in the framework for inspection, whereas on the other hand, it concerns the needed separation of
these in the feedback provided by inspectors.
An inconsistency also arises after inspectors have given their feedback to schools. The pro-
gram theory speaks about different forms of inspection for strong and weak schools. Weak
schools receive more elaborate visits and need to develop plans for improvement that are
assessed by the inspectorate. However, improvement trajectories are voluntary unless schools
do not meet the legal requirements. As the legal requirements are not assessed separately but are
part of a more elaborated framework to assess school quality, it is not logical to define weak
schools by just referring to the legal requirements. It may therefore happen that the improve-
ment trajectories are assigned to a larger contingent of schools than just the ones that fail to meet
the legal requirements. Some schools run the risk of being confronted with an improvement tra-
jectory that is presented as compulsory, whereas, in fact, it is not. Other schools may not be con-
fronted with an improvement trajectory at all, whereas, in fact, they should. Again, the extent to
which schools are free to decide for themselves whether they need to improve and how
autonomous they are may not be clear in reality.
A last inconsistency concerns the proportional inspection. Schools are expected to develop
their own quality assurance system and to use their own quality norms in close contact with
their pupil population and environment, whereas, in fact, they are rewarded for a specific qual-
ity assurance system that only gives reliable information about the indicators in the inspection
framework. Another example of how rewarding may lead to unwanted results is when weak
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schools receive extra financial means to improve, whereas strong schools do not receive extra
money.
Completeness
The program theory lacks a number of definitions that are necessary to implement the Edu-
cational Supervision Act correctly or to assess if it is meeting the results that it intents to meet.
The assumptions fail to explain, for example, what “a satisfactory level of educational quality”
is. In connection to this incompleteness, a distinction between strong and weak schools and an
allocation of an evaluative or an advisory inspection to strong and weak schools is hard to make.
The program theory is also unclear about, for example, the competencies of inspectors or the
way schools should account for their results. We will not elaborate on these factors here, as they
are considered to be factors that are not regulated in legislation and are therefore not part of this
program theory.
Realism
The program theory assumes that schools use the feedback of inspection to improve.
Improvement is expected to lead to satisfactory levels of educational quality and more added
value. Schools are assumed to support both inspection and feedback from inspection and are
assumed capable of improvement (with some support from their environment). The program
theory also provides for the publication by the inspectorate of the results of school inspections.
Parents are assumed to stimulate schools to improve by recommending possible improvements
and by choosing only high-quality schools. Some (likely) flaws in the theory are considered
below.
Feedback provided by the inspectorate or resulting from quality assurance does not neces-
sarily lead to improvement. There are a number of prerequisites for feedback to lead to
improvement (Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). First of all, the school
needs to experience the feedback as relevant, understandable, clear, and useful (Brimblecombe,
Shaw, & Ormston, 1996; Doolaard & Karstanje, 2001). Feedback of the inspectorate has a
larger chance of being used when teachers are involved in recommendations, when support is
given to the school (Gray & Wilcox, 1995), when schools have insight in their own strong and
weak points, when their culture is open to feedback and outside criticism (Early, 1998), and
when inspectors illustrate both the cause of bad performance as well as its remedy (Doolaard &
Karstanje, 2001; Gray & Gardner, 1999).
Even when schools do use the feedback provided by the inspectorate to start improving, it
does not necessarily lead to the desired results. According to Geijsel (2001) and Reezigt (2001),
the likelihood that a school will successfully improve depends on such internal features as
cooperation between teachers and organizational learning, as well as on the context of the
school (e.g., the level of support provided by parents).
Prior research shows that schools that start to change after inspection mainly focus on
enhancing commitment of teachers to the school, formulating behavioral rules for pupils, set-
ting up strategies for improving examination results, and changing management style and struc-
ture (Kogan & Maden, 1999, p. 18; Visscher, 2002, p. 62). Inspection does not influence educa-
tional and subject goals, nor the didactic, methods, division of labor, or internal communication
in the school (Brimblecombe et al., 1996; Chapman, 2001). Research in the United Kingdom
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even shows a decline in achievement levels in the year of the inspection visit (Cullingford,
Daniels, & Brown, 1998; Rosenthal, 2004; Shaw, Newton, Aitkin, & Darnell, 2003).
Parents do not use the public information about schools provided by the inspectorate.
Research shows that parents are interested in matters other than inspection results (e.g.,
Dronkers & Veenstra, 2001; Educational Council, 2001; Karsten & Visscher, 2001). They are
primarily concerned about the atmosphere, pedagogical climate, working methods, safety, clar-
ity of regulations, waiting lists for special education, reputation of the school, and about deci-
sions concerning the promotion of pupils to the next class. When parents do suggest possible
improvements, these usually involve such conditional matters as timetables (Educational
Council, 2001). Parents do not generally interfere in matters relating to educational quality, nor
are their school choices based on educational quality. Only 2% of the parents (mostly those who
are more highly educated) use pupil learning results as a criterion for choosing a school
(Dronkers & Veenstra, 2001, p. 33). For most parents, proximity, cost, and religious foundation
play a larger role in school choice. According to Hargreaves (1995), there is also little evidence
of parents seeking alternatives to an exposed failing school.
Perhaps this will change when public information about schools on the Internet is more com-
monly used and available to more parents than just the higher educated ones, but for now, we
cannot expect a large number of activities from parents.
Schools are not inclined to use criticism from parents for school improvement. Suggestions
from parents for possible improvements do not usually result in actual improvement. Because
parents do not pay the bill for education, schools do not feel that it is necessary to take prefer-
ences of parents into consideration (Educational Council, 2001). In the Netherlands, the present
system of educational financing gives schools very little incentive to perform better, as weak
schools are ensured of enough pupils and weak teachers maintain their salaries (Waterreus,
2003, p. 33). When schools must compete for pupils, they are likely to be more inclined to
improve their public relations and after-school activities than they are to improve their
educational quality.
Possible side effects are left out. Schools do not always have an interest in cooperating dur-
ing the inspection visit or to perform all the activities that are necessary to improve after or in
relation to inspection. A school, for example, must provide information on (painful) matters so
that inspectors can identify and publish the weak spots. According to Kerr (1975), people will
more readily perform behaviors for which they will be rewarded. In this case, schools clearly
have no incentive for revealing their weak points to the inspectorate. Schools are much more
likely to anticipate the inspection visits and to behave in different ways as they usually do
(Smith, 1995, p. 280). Chapman (2001) found, for example, that teachers prepare and structure
their lessons better when inspectors visit the school. Some schools even take improper actions,
according to Wiebes (1998), such as sending risky pupils to another school, selecting pupils
before entrance, withdrawing from or training pupils for tests, or having pupils stay down a
class. The public results of inspection are a large cause for this kind of behavior, according to
the Educational Council (2001) and Dijkstra, Karsten, Veenstra, and Visscher (2001).
Smith (1995) also found that schools might focus on the indicators in the framework when
planning their educational processes. This can lead to ossification, that is, schools may refrain
from undertaking innovative activities that do not fit the framework and are thus not rewarded
by the inspection system.
Although it is too early to present any results from proportional inspection, the same type of
argumentation can be made for this working method. The inspectorate uses self-evaluation
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results only if they meet strict conditions (they must provide reliable information about the indi-
cators in the inspection framework). As a result, schools are not rewarded for quality assurance
systems using indicators that differ from the inspection framework.
The situation described above could result in schools starting to look alike, at least in terms
of inspection findings (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). The performance indicators in the frame-
work for inspection lose their sensitivity in detecting bad performance or low quality. Schools
learn which aspects of their performance are measured and which are not. They can use this
knowledge to influence the assessment of the inspectorate, mainly by investing in improving
the performance that will be measured rather than aiming for underlying goals. This “perverse
learning” (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2003) occurs, for example, when schools invest in developing
and implementing a certain type of pupil monitoring system, described in the framework as a
good example, instead of focusing on how to give pupils the best possible care.
Discussion
In this article, we reconstructed the program theory of the Dutch Educational Supervision
Act to describe how inspections should lead to certain results. The merit of this method lies in
the possibility to give a critical evaluation of assumptions behind innovations or interventions;
in this study, the school inspections as laid down in the Educational Supervision Act. A second
merit is the link between theory and practice that is made when reconstructing program theory
as a starting point for further research. The means, goals, and intervening mechanisms can be
used to develop variables for further investigation. If the results of further investigation show no
effects, these can be explained by comparing real program implementation to intended imple-
mentation. If these do not match, an explanation for the absence of effects may be faulty
program implementation.
A program theory approach has some drawbacks, however. Perrin (1999) stated a major one
by saying that it is not sufficient to judge the value or impact of a program or initiative based
only on its intent and on what it claims to do. It is essential to examine what really happens and
the extent to which the outcomes are a result of the program intervention or are due to other fac-
tors. Elte (1988, p. 2) also underlined the importance of looking at real (implemented) means
and goals by saying that informal assumptions mostly influence the functioning and results of
organizations instead of formal intentions.
Another drawback of this kind of program theory can also be the prescription to reconstruct
program statements in causal terms. In reality, legislation is not always based on causal links.
The method of analyzing documents in search of statements that link means to goals may even
do harm to real intentions and assumptions behind legislation or may result in a model that does
not correspond to reality. Some authors (e.g., Hoogerwerf, 1984) seem to solve this problem by
adding other types of relations such as the ones between causes and consequences/effects and
between principles and values or between principles and values on the one side and existing or
expected situations. We attempted to solve this problem by organizing a separate participant
check in which policy makers assessed the adequacy of the assumptions in relation to the
intentions of the act.
Using a program theory approach for further research is particularly useful when the objec-
tive is to try and find possible implementation failures that occur when a program is not imple-
mented as intended. One should be careful, however, in using a program theory approach for
investigating effects of interventions, such as school inspections, when the theoretical evalua-
tion shows that the described assumptions are not consistent, complete, and realistic. After all, it
does not seem meaningful to use an incorrect implemented program theory for further investi-
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gation, as empirical research shows that an incorrect program theory can lead to ineffective
policy (Walraven, 1991, p. 12).
A correct, realistic, and implemented program theory, on the other hand, also does not guar-
antee success as other factors may play a role, such as competencies of inspectors and the
capacity of schools to change. However, a correct and realistic program theory can be a good
framework for searching for and filling in these other factors. This may be especially important
when no control group or zero point of measurement exists and experimental research is out of
the question.
This study has, so far, only shown a number of theoretical failures. The actual implementa-
tion of the Educational Supervision Act may correct these. Further research is needed to investi-
gate whether this is indeed the case and whether this means that inspection leads to the desired
results.
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